Abstract-The security of software-based systems is one of the most difficult issues when accessing the suitability of systems to most application scenarios. However, security is very hard to evaluate and quantify, and there are no standard methods to benchmark the security of software systems. This work proposes a novel methodology for benchmarking the security of softwarebased systems. This methodology uses the notion of risk in a quantifiable way and allows the comparison of functionallyequivalent systems (or different configurations of the same system) to enable users and system integrators to identify and select the most secure one. The benchmark methodology is based on both analytical and experimental steps and can be applicable to any software system. The benchmark procedures and rules guide users on how to instantiate the methodology to specific scenarios and how to execute the benchmark. In this paper we also present an instantiation of the methodology to a case study of web-serving systems and show how to use the results to identify the most secure system under benchmark.
INTRODUCTION
Most aspects of current society and lifestyle are heavily dependent on computer-based systems. From financing institutions to utility infrastructures, such as power distribution, many services essential to daily life are based on computers. Thus, the correct behavior of these computer-based systems is absolutely essential to the well-being of people and business, and many efforts are devoted to that effect. There are many system attributes involved when assuring the continued correct behavior of computer-based systems (e.g., robustness, fault tolerance, etc.). Among these, one important attribute is the security: in fact, given our current scenario where business and people lives are governed by digital data stored in computers, the destructive potential of successful attacks against those computers are almost limitless. Its consequences can range from simple web site defacing to very serious identity theft, financial fraud, and even national security threats.
Security is very difficult to assure. Many factors contribute to this: security is related to vulnerabilities in software, and these are hard to foresee or detect before an actual attack; security involves personal aspects (e.g., user or operator issues) and aspects of the operational environment that are often beyond the control of the development teams. Most of all, security (or the lack of it) is related to an actual directed intent from malicious adversaries who try their best to break the target systems. Developers and administrators must try and counteract unknown actions from unknown adversaries.
Efforts to increase the security of computers, and, more specifically, software-based systems, are having limited success, as attackers also increase theirs efforts and skills, and in fact, the scenario is getting worse. Data from the field shows that the general numbers of security incidents (i.e., successful attacks) have increased in the last decade (e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] ). This is mainly due to the increasing complexity of new technologies and the growing complexity of systems, leaving space for more vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers.
In this scenario, when required to select one system from several functionally-equivalent ones, users now consider security attributes of systems at least as important as other attributes, such as price, or performance. Unfortunately, security attributes are not easy to assess and there are no standard methods to compare system security attributes.
One common practice among software buyers and endusers is to rely on a set of security evaluation methods [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and tools [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] to make their purchase decisions. The goal is to provide an idea of the security level of a given system based on a set of security requirement, tests, or software maturity (e.g.: Is the system free from known vulnerabilities? Are the common attacked ports properly closed? Etc.). The problem is that current security evaluation methods and tools have well-known limitations. Furthermore, the use of separated tools without an unified strategy to compute a global security metric only provides a fragmented view (e.g., [19] [20] [21] ) and makes the task of assessing and comparing security rather difficult for software buyers and end-users, that are not, in general, security experts. Thus, there is a clear need for security benchmarks able to provide a comprehensive and easy-to-use approach to compare security attributes of competing systems/components. This paper proposes such benchmark and exemplifies the proposed approach in a web-serving systems scenario to demonstrate the applicability of our benchmark methodology.
Web-serving systems form the basis of many services, such as e-commerce and banking systems. These systems are heterogeneous and complex, based on several discrete components. This internal complexity potentiates the existence of vulnerabilities that might be exploited by attackers. Because these systems are naturally connected to the Internet, and thus exposed to many users and attackers, any internal vulnerability becomes a real threat to security ( [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] ). Therefore, the webserving scenario as case study of our benchmark is relevant.
Our benchmark methodology is organized in two parts (static and dynamic). The first part corresponds to a static analysis of the target system and uses the knowledge about the impact and exploitability of vulnerabilities discovered in the field for that system. These known vulnerabilities are obtained from two sources: (i) public repositories such as vulnerabilities databases and specialized web sites (e.g., [30] [31] [32] [33] ); and (ii) results from security tests usually proposed by security experts. The second part includes robustness attacks to observe the behavior of the system and a runtime analysis of the system using vulnerability and attack injection techniques ( [34] [35] ) to estimate the security risk resulting from possible but yet unknown vulnerabilities. In particular, the dynamic part of our benchmark methodology is a novel approach for security risk estimation that redefines and extends previous works such as [36] . The fact that our security benchmark methodology is designed to address any class of software-based system, and also considering that this second part targets unknown vulnerabilities, make absolutely clear that this paper provides a totally new approach over what was proposed in [36] , which presents a security benchmark for web serving systems focusing only on known vulnerabilities.
We believe that our proposal will contribute to the definition of security benchmarks, covering generic types of systems and/or components, in the following manner:
• Presents a methodology to quantify risk based on both static and dynamic aspects of the target systems, including known vulnerabilities and an estimation of potential damage from unknown vulnerabilities.
• Proposes a practical approach to inject vulnerabilities and execute attacks to observe the behavior of the systems regarding yet-to-be-discovered vulnerabilities.
• Presents an example of a security benchmark specification for web serving systems that can help users to build security benchmarks for other systems types, and shows how to use the results to compare systems.
• Provides prototypes and tools that speed up the extraction of information and analysis of vulnerabilities.
II. RELATED WORK
Several security evaluation methods have been proposed in recent years to help developers to identify and solve common vulnerabilities in their products, and also to provide end-users with an idea about the security level of their software systems.
Security standards are an example of evaluation methods that have been used to implement and enforce mandatory controls in computer systems (e.g., ISO 17799:2005 [5] , NIST Handbook [6] ), and NIST SP800-44 [7] ). Although these standards are very useful to help users to apply organization security policies, they are not intended to provide means to measure the security of systems in a comparative way.
Security evaluation methods that assign a security rate to systems based on the existence of pre-defined security controls are also found in literature. The ITSEC [8] and Common Criteria [9] are examples of methods that target generic computer security issues; more specific systems or components are respectively covered in [10] and [12] . Our approach goes much further than using checklists as it proposes a formal benchmark and includes the dynamic evaluation of the system. An approach that has been used by vendors and users to detect common errors made by software developers is the use of vulnerability scanners [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . These tools use their own repositories and detect known vulnerabilities. In our approach, we use these tools to automate the detection of vulnerabilities and to not depend only on information from public platforms.
Another approach is the execution of attacks to assess the security behavior of the target system. In [35] , it is presented an attack injection tool that simulates the behavior of an attacker by injecting attacks against the target system, observing the execution of the system to check if these attacks resulted in a security compromise (if the attack is successful, it means an unknown vulnerability is present). In our paper, we use a similar approach, also taking advantage of the attack injection methodology proposed in [34] .
One of the challenges in the security evaluation of systems for comparative purposes (security benchmarking) is the definition and validation of a standardized, reproducible, and cost-effective way to estimate a security metric. Several initiatives addressing security evaluation point out that security benchmarking is still an open research problem (e.g., [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] ).
The notion of benchmarking has been extensively applied to the field of computer performance [43] [44] [45] [46] and to computer dependability [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] . In [47] we can find a review of recent works on dependability benchmarking, including dependability benchmarks [48] for on-line transaction process systems [49] , web-servers [50] , and operating systems [51] . These works introduce the key properties that should be present in a benchmark: representativeness of its components (e.g., workload, metrics, etc.) -which is essential for the acceptance of the benchmark by the industry and user's community; and portability and reproducibility of the benchmark. Our benchmark approach is based on these concepts to mitigate the biases from ad hoc or non-standardized measurements.
The Center for Internet Security [52] proposed a set of evaluators they named as "benchmarks" for several classes of systems. Although these proposals are effective to help users to improve the configuration of components at risk, these evaluators cannot be seen as real benchmarks since they do not translate the benchmark results into a single security metric, making comparison between systems unpractical as different metrics may yield different rankings. In [36] , it is proposed a security benchmark for web serving systems based on known vulnerabilities, using the notion of security risk and procedures that we adopt. In [53] , a software product evaluation method is described, using a quantitative risk assessment based on information collected from the National Vulnerability Database. Our methodology goes beyond these works as it can be adapted to any class of systems and it includes a dynamic evaluation of the system addressing unknown vulnerabilities.
The project Making Security Measurable (MSM) led by MITRE Corporation has brought together existing activities and initiatives related to security evaluation [54] . In our methodology, we use four of these initiatives: the Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE, a dictionary of common names for publicly known information security vulnerabilities), Vulnerability Databases (such as [30] and [31] , used to identify known vulnerabilities present in the system under benchmark), the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS, a open and standardized method to rate the risk of vulnerabilities that we apply to estimate our benchmark metric) [55] , and the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC, an attack model reference that we use to implement the attacks of the dynamic part) [59] .
III. A SECURITY BENCHMARK METHODOLOGY FOR SOFTWARE-BASED SYSTEMS

A. Benchmark General Approach
Our security benchmark methodology is based on the notion of security risk, which is computed using the impact and probability of having a successful vulnerability exploitation (i.e., a successful attack). The methodology is designed to cover the two existing categories of vulnerabilities: known (previously discovered for the target system) and unknown (not yet discovered). Both categories are addressed by the two parts of our methodology: static and dynamic, respectively. The static part is aimed at measuring security risk posed by existing and already discovered vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, if still present in a given system (e.g., the administrator has not yet patched the system), can be exploited and pose a security risk. The known vulnerabilities are identified using two sources: (1) known vulnerabilities listed in public platforms, and (2) results from security-testing tools having large databases of known vulnerabilities. Public platforms such as vulnerability databases (e.g., [30] [31] [32] [33] ) already contain the CVSS impact and exploitability scores that we use to calculate the vulnerability risk of known vulnerabilities (with the proper adjustments detailed in section C). The risk is estimated for each identified vulnerability and then added up to form the accumulated security risk resulting from the static part.
The dynamic part of the benchmark is focused on the analysis of the behavior of the system when facing realistic attacks that can unfold unknown vulnerabilities. This is done using two complementary approaches: (1) stressing the system with malicious input parameters and a high load of attacks (e.g., Denial of Services attacks, Buffer Overflow) directed against components that interact with end-users (termed here as interface-related attacks); and (2) mounting attacks against vulnerabilities that are injected in a component that is not included in the benchmark target (but interacts with it).
The purpose of injecting representative vulnerabilities and attacking them is to anticipate if a security breach (a successful attack that leads to a security compromise) in a component may affect the security of the whole system under benchmark. For example, by injecting vulnerabilities in the web application (it is plausible to assume that applications may have vulnerabilities) we can assess if the attacks launched over such vulnerabilities can compromise the system. This idea was already applied in fault injection field to assess the behavior of fault tolerant system in the presence of erroneous software components and the goal here is to apply this concept to the security field, using the attack injection technique proposed in [34] , which we detail later on.
The benchmark is built around the elements derived from classical works on performance and dependability benchmarks [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] such as metrics, workload, procedures and rules. We also adopted the same terminology used in classical benchmarking to name the elements involved in the benchmark execution: the Benchmark Management System (BMS) that orchestrates benchmark runs, the Benchmark Target (BT) that is the component directly evaluated and characterized by the benchmark, and the System Under Benchmark (SUB) which is the complete system including the BT and all components needed to the proper execution of the benchmark target. We describe these elements below.
Metric. Our benchmark metric is security risk, which is estimated by the weighted sum of the security risk resulting from the static and the dynamic parts of the benchmark. Vulnerabilities are classified into three categories of security risk: low, medium and high. The goal of this categorization is to allow comparing (and ranking) scenarios of, for instance, many low-risk vulnerabilities versus few high-risk vulnerabilities. In section D, more details are provided about the metric equation and measurement guidelines.
Procedures and Rules to guide users to run the benchmark and ensure that it is not twisted to favor a particular brand or vendor. These procedures and rules are described in section E.
Instrumentation, including all the mechanisms and tools used in the context of the benchmark, from the benchmark execution to the estimation of benchmark metric. In section IV, we present more details about our case study instrumentation that can be adapted for other domains.
B. Benchmark Static Part
The static part includes the tasks of collecting vulnerability information and running security tests to identify known vulnerabilities present in the systems under benchmark.
There are two supporting benchmark components related to the information on known vulnerabilities: the vulnerability repository and the security test repository, described below.
The Vulnerability Repository keeps vulnerability information collected from sources such as public vulnerability platforms that are later used to identify known vulnerabilities in the system under benchmark. A vulnerability information refers to the whole set of data used to report and characterize a vulnerability. The following represents the minimum information (for each vulnerability) required by this security benchmark methodology to build a repository: id (e.g., CVE ID), release date, description, affected system, affected components, affected versions, affected platforms, CVSS impact, CVSS exploitability. These data should be stored in a database repository using the Entity-Relationship data model [56] , where Vulnerability represents the main entity and each vulnerability ID represents a unique record. A comprehensive example of vulnerability data model was proposed by OSVDB [31] . We use that data model in the instantiation of this methodology for web serving systems (section IV).
Security Test
Repository. This is a database with a list of non-intrusive tests that can be used by a tool to confirm the existence of a given known vulnerability in the system under benchmark. In the context of our security benchmark methodology, a security test is the verification of a security practice or the exploit of a known vulnerability. An example is the following web server security practice [57] : "Disable direct file system access (directory browsing, directory traversal, etc.)". The security test of this practice refers to the verification of the web server configuration or content to confirm if directory listing is enabled or not. This test also can be seen as a non-intrusive exploit of the CVE-2006-3835 directory listing vulnerability, which affects Apache Tomcat 5. The following represents the minimum information required to a security test repository: test ID, description, affected system, affected component, affected versions, CVE-ID, security practice, technical command, CVSS impact and CVSS exploitability. If a security test is derived from a known vulnerability that has a CVSS score, the impact and exploitability factors are already reported in public platforms. Otherwise, CVSS criteria should be followed to estimate the impact and exploitability of the vulnerability associated to the implemented security test. The reason why we incorporated security tests in the static part of our methodology is in the fact that not all known vulnerabilities are reported in public platforms [58] . Also, this also enables users to take advantage of vulnerability scanners as a complementary approach (in addition to the vulnerability repository) to identify known vulnerabilities.
C. Benchmark Dynamic Part
The dynamic part of our approach addresses the measurement of the risk related to unknown vulnerabilities. This is done by executing attacks against the system under benchmark while observing the impact of vulnerability exploitation in the system (in other words, observing the capacity of the system to tolerate those attacks). As mentioned before, a two-fold attack approach is followed:
Attacks against the system interface. These attacks target the components that interact with the end-users (the system interface) and, in the context of this paper, are aimed at checking the behavior of the system when dealing with input data overflow and malicious manipulation of system input parameters. The interface-related attacks use relevant field studies (published by trustable sources of security community, e.g., [1] and [2] ) to identify common interface security issues and are implemented by using the attack patterns provided in CAPEC [60] [61] . To automate this step, our methodology allows the deployment of tools such as penetration testing and exploit kits (e.g. [62] and others listed in [17] ).
Attacks against a component outside the benchmark target.
The system under benchmark is formed by interconnected subsystems or components with different security issues (e.g., operating systems, web server, database management system, etc.). In this sense, it is important to observe the behavior of the benchmark target when attacks are conducted against other elements of the system (e.g., the web application) that are not part of the benchmark target but interacts with such system. Our approach includes the injection of realistic vulnerabilities in the external component and launching attacks that exploit such vulnerabilities. The benchmark target should be able to cope with attacks in the external component and this step of the dynamic part is meant to assess that.
It is worth noting that a typical scenario of security benchmarking in web serving systems is to compare different configurations of a given web serving system or different web serving systems for purchase decision. In this case, the web application is regarded as being outside of the benchmark target (it is used to exercise the system). Although the web application is the most evident example of an external element to be subject to vulnerability injection and attacks, our approach can be used with any other external component.
The idea of conducting attacks in a component that is outside the benchmark target is inspired in classical works of dependability benchmarking (e.g., [63] ). To this end, our methodology applies the attack injection technique proposed in [34] to mount these attacks. Attack injection consists in injecting vulnerabilities into a particular system component that are later exploited during the benchmark run. Vulnerability injection is the artificial injection of software faults that, when activated (i.e., successful attack), compromise either partially or completely at least one of the security attributes of the system. The injection of vulnerabilities is justified by the need of anticipating security breaches that may occur in another component. It is expected the compromise of the behavior of the component with injected vulnerabilities during the execution of attacks, since its code is unsafe. However, it is not expected a change of the behavior of the benchmark target while attacks are being executed in another component. Also, it is important to remark that our methodology relies on vulnerability field studies to identify and characterize real security issues present in the system under benchmark. This is particularly relevant to define where a vulnerability is located and what is the piece of code/configuration that corresponds to a vulnerability. An example of field study that targets web application vulnerabilities is presented in [64] , where the authors classified 655 cross-site scripting and SQL injection vulnerabilities present in different web applications.
The benchmark components that are used in the dynamic part are described as follows:
Workload: represents the load submitted to the system under benchmark and is composed by representative tasks for the class of that system. The workload is an essential component of benchmarks in general. In the context of pure performance benchmark, it is directly used to derive the metric values. In dependability benchmarks, it is required to exercise the system and to observe its behavior when specific areas of the system are activated (e.g., those that may contain faults). In our work, the need for a workload shares similarities with dependability benchmarks: we require that specific areas of the system be activated to expose (and make available to attacks) possible vulnerabilities existing in those areas. These are the minimum requirements to the selection of a workload: (1) it should simulate a realistic execution of the system under benchmark (with user interaction and transactions); (2) it should allow development of new features (to collect benchmark measurements and to incorporate the attackload components); (3) it should be executed in a reasonably short period of time.
Vulnerability injector: changes pieces of a component code/configuration (the vulnerability target) to a vulnerable state to enable successful attacks during the benchmark execution. The minimum requirements to build a vulnerability injector component are as follows: (1) only vulnerabilities that are representative of that system should be injected (2) the injection should be done in a component different from the benchmark target (for the reasons previously described).
Attackload: includes a representative set of attacks that are executed against the system under benchmark to measure their security risk in an experimental way. The minimum requirements to build an attackload component are: (1) the exploits should attack a component that is not part of the benchmark target (as discussed above); (2) CAPEC should be used as an attack model reference, to make sure that exploits are properly mounted; (3) each attack should exploit a particular vulnerability (this is necessary to avoid any doubts in the security measurements regarding the vulnerability exploitation that caused a security compromise of the benchmark target); (4) the attackload should be set up to run along with the workload (this is needed to observe the behavior of the system while attacks are executed).
D. Benchmark Metric Composition
The security benchmark metric is calculated considering four elements: vulnerability risk (VR), risk category, component risk (CR) per category, and weighted system risk (SR) per category. The system risk is estimated independently for each benchmark part (static and dynamic) and the weight sum of the security risk (per category) of these parts represents the benchmark security risk. These metric elements and the estimation approach are explained as follows:
Vulnerability Risk (VR) Measurement. VR is estimated considering the product of the impact of vulnerability exploitation (I) with the probability of a successful vulnerability exploitation (P), as detailed in Equation (1). The impact factor refers to the effect of a successful vulnerability exploitation on the security attributes. To translate this assessment into a numeric value, our methodology applies the approach proposed by Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [55] . An example of complete impact to the availability attribute is an attack that is able to bring the system down for a long period of time. The probability factor refers to the easiness of exploiting a vulnerability, which is translated by CVSS as the exploitability factor and is given by vulnerability access vector (from local to remote network), access complexity (low, medium, high) and authentication (none, single, multiple). An attack with the highest exploitability level is the one that can be executed remotely, with little skill needed to mount and execute the attack, and with no need of authentication in the target system. For the static part of our methodology, impact and exploitability factors are collected from public repositories. For the dynamic part, instrumentation should be deployed to assess the impact and exploitability of the vulnerabilities that are discovered. One important note is that CVSS impact and exploitability score varies from 0 to 10. The higher the values, the higher the risk of the assessed vulnerability. In our methodology, the value of the exploitability score is divided by 10 in order to make it fall in the range of 0-1 that used when dealing with probabilities, as required in the probability factor of the equation presented below.
Vulnerability Risk Categorization. The purpose of this step is to categorize vulnerability risk in three groups: low, medium and high. This is done because low-risk vulnerabilities do not harm the system in the same way as high-risk vulnerabilities (when successfully exploited). For example, if an attacker is able to compromise several low-risk vulnerabilities in the same system, he or she may not succeed in causing a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability to the system. However, a successful exploitation of a single high-risk vulnerability will result in a total security compromise of one of the security attributes. In a security benchmarking perspective, this means that the most secure system is the one with the lowest level of high-risk vulnerabilities. To bring this key notion to the benchmark metric, our security benchmark methodology uses the same criterion applied by the National Vulnerability Database to define the risk ranges of each one of these risk categories: Low Risk (VRL -if the risk score ranges from 0 to 3.9 as illustrated in Equation 2), Medium Risk (VRM -if the score ranges from 4.0 to 6.9 -Equation 3), and High Risk (VHR -if the score ranges from 7 to 10 -Equation 4). These ranges are defined based on the Risk Score Categorization of the National Vulnerability Database. Also, and as detailed later on, each one of these categories is reflected in the benchmark metric in the form of a weight. Naturally, we defined a much higher weight to the high-risk category, since vulnerabilities under this category are more prone to be attacked and, when successfully attacked, the security compromise is complete.
Component Security Risk Estimation (CR)
. This measure is estimated by adding the vulnerability risk (VRL, VRM, VRH) of each risk category (CR-Low or CRL; CR-Medium or CRM; and CR-High or CRH). Given the fact that vulnerabilities within the same component share the same impact scale, the sum of the each contributing vulnerability category yields the compound risk of that component.
System Security Risk Estimation for the Benchmark Static (SSR) and Dynamic (DSR)
Parts. This consists in the weighted sum of the categorized security risk obtained independently during each benchmark part for execution, as shown in Equations 2 to 7. The weight of each component (W) reflects the relevance of that component to the system. As different benchmarks users may have different views on the relative weight of the different components, the final assignment weights to components is left to the benchmark users.
Benchmark Risk Estimation (SR). The benchmark metric (SBench, Equation 11) represents the overall system security risk from the static (SSR) and dynamic parts (DSR). The higher is the security risk of the system, the bigger is the benchmark metric, with no upper limit. More specifically, the system security risk ( Equation 11) is given by the sum of the product of the security risk of each metric category (Equations 8 to 10) and the weight of each one of these categories. As introduced early, this weight is used to properly reflect in the benchmark metric the risk relevance of each vulnerability identified. In Equation 11 , it is possible to observe that the high-risk category weight is three times bigger than the medium category and fifteen times bigger than the low category, increasing the influence of high security risks in the benchmark metric. It is worth noting that, in a future proposal of a security benchmark standard based on our methodology, the decision on the weighs should be part of a technical agreement among industry and stakeholders. Technical agreements are quite common in performance benchmarks like TPC and SPEC and our metric estimation approach should be seen as a contribution in this agreement direction. (10) SBench = SRH * 0.75+ SRM *0.25+ SRL * 0.05 ( 
11)
E. Benchmark Procedures & Rules
The execution of our benchmark methodology starts by checking the version and configuration of all the components under study, followed by the extraction, characterization, and analysis of vulnerabilities present in those components and execution of security tests (static part), by the injection of vulnerabilities and execution of the workload and attacks (dynamic part), and by the estimation of benchmark the metric. Most of these steps (vulnerability extraction and analysis and attacks execution) are automated and are described later on.
Static Part Benchmarking Steps
The execution profile of the static part is organized in two stages. The first stage consists in extracting information on vulnerabilities from public repositories and filtering those present in the system under benchmark, as follows:
1. Extraction of known vulnerabilities from public vulnerabilities platforms.
Filter the collected vulnerability reports.
The extraction may bring information that is not associated with the system components. This step then serves to keep the vulnerability set in a well-formed state, free from multiple vulnerability reports. 3 . Remove unnecessary vulnerability reports. This refers to the step necessary to discard vulnerabilities unrelated to the version and configuration of the system under benchmark.
The rules to select a representative security tool is as follows: (1) It should have a large set of tests to identify known vulnerabilities -additional tests from other tools can be incorporated in order to reach a representative range of tests and cover a large amount of known vulnerabilities; (2) it should execute non-intrusive tests against the system (the goal is just to check if a given vulnerability exist, and not to execute attacks that are covered in the dynamic part); (3) it should require minimum customization and few technical expertise to be deployed on the benchmark management system; (4) it should allow the development of new features to automate the estimation of the benchmark metrics described in subsection D.
Both stages end with the estimation of the risk for each vulnerability. This consists in gathering the impact and exploitability level of a known vulnerability available in NVD and OSVDB and using the equations of subsection D to estimate the benchmark metric of the static part.
Dynamic Part Benchmarking Steps
The execution profile of the dynamic part is as follows:
Inspection stage. The main goal of this stage is to collect baseline measurements. The main rule here is that the system (workload) is executed with no attack execution.
Vulnerability injection stage.
The goal of this step is the injection of vulnerabilities into the vulnerable target, as this will allow the execution of successful attacks. The vulnerabilities injected should be representative of the security issues that are common in the system under benchmark. The rule here is that the vulnerable component (e.g., the web application as in the implementation of the benchmark also presented here) should not be considered in benchmark measurement, since the benchmark target is the one that we want to benchmark. The injection of vulnerability can be either done automatically (through an automated vulnerability injector) or manually (through the injection of vulnerability in the source code before the benchmark run). These are the steps (inspired in [34] ) we recommend to inject vulnerabilities in software-based systems:
1. Characterize the place in the source code where the vulnerability is likely to be found. 2. Put the source code of the benchmark target in a workspace where vulnerabilities can be injected. 3. Change the code to a vulnerable state. For example, an input variable that is correctly escaped could be mutated to allow parameter injection attacks. 4. Compile the code where vulnerabilities were injected, preparing it to be deployed. It is important to remark that a vulnerable code is free of compilation errors. 5. Deploy the vulnerable content back to system side since it will run along with the workload and later exploited by attack.
Attack stage. The benchmark executes realistic attacks against the vulnerable target and collect security measurements from the benchmark target. These attacks are done against the vulnerabilities that were injected. Each vulnerability is exploited in a separate benchmark run, where one or more attacks are executed. During the run we collect security measurements from the benchmark target to assess its security behavior. This approach uses the attack injection method proposed in [34] . However, we believe that it can be adapted to a wider variety of software-based systems. The attack stage consists of the simultaneous execution of the workload and of the attackload, i.e., the system under benchmark is run while attacks exploit the vulnerabilities injected in the vulnerable target. The rules to exploit a vulnerability are as follows:
• Each vulnerability should be exploited individually, in a separated workload execution to avoid undesirable weakness propagation. This is needed to properly identify the vulnerability that will impact the behavior of the system during the execution of attack.
• One or more attacks can be conducted over the same vulnerability to simulate multiple attacks.
Results gathering. In this step, the benchmark assesses the exploitability and the impact of vulnerability exploitation. The criteria here are the same proposed by CVSS. The exploitability ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, where 0 is a system very hard to exploit and 1.0 very easy to exploit considering three factors: access vector (local, adjacent network, network), access complexity (low, medium, high), and authentication (multiple, single, none).
The impact is given considering the partial or complete compromise of each one of the security attributes as defined by CVSS. Here are the summarized rules:
• A partial confidentiality compromise occurs if the access to some restricted contents is possible; or the attacker does not have control over what is obtained, or the scope of the loss is constrained. A complete confidentiality compromise occurs when at least one of these previous conditions were totally met. This rule applies to the other security attributes.
• A partial integrity compromise occurs if the attacker does not have control over what can be modified; or the content may changed in a limited way; or the system is not providing the expected response for some requests. A complete integrity compromise occurs if all content can be modified and so on.
• A partial availability compromise occurs if the system became unavailable for a (even short) period of time or a trustable host had its connection denied. A complete availability compromise occurs if the system became unavailable longer than the workload timeout.
Benchmark Metric Composition
The final stage of the benchmark execution is the estimation of the benchmark metric based on the values provided in the static and dynamic parts. For each vulnerability risk of each component, the equations of the Benchmark Metric (section D) are used to estimate the benchmark security risk.
IV. A SECURITY BENCHMARK IMPLEMENTATION FOR WEB SERVING SYSTEMS
This section presents an implementation example of our security benchmark methodology for web serving systems. Our goal is to provide a helpful guideline on how to overcome the technical difficulties to implement a security benchmark.
A. Benchmark Static Part Implementation
The static part of our methodology was implemented by developing a tool to extract and analyze vulnerability information from publicly available CVSS-based vulnerability databases and by adapting a security testing tool [15] to verify the presence or absence of a known vulnerability (dangerous files, outdated versions, information disclosure, etc.).
Automated Vulnerability Extraction and Analysis from Public Vulnerability Databases (Vulnerability Repository)
We developed a vulnerability extraction and analysis tool (VEXA) to speed up the collection of real, known vulnerabilities from the field (NVD and OSVDB) and build the benchmark vulnerability repository.
VEXA is available in a standalone and command-line format. The web-based format collects and extracts vulnerability information and provides the results in a CSV format. The command-line version is the interface that integrates VEXA with the other benchmark tools and provides summarized results along with the vulnerability risk of each detected vulnerability. This risk forms, along with the risks of the known vulnerabilities detected by the security tool, the security risk of the static part. The technology supporting VEXA tool is described in [36] .
Automated Vulnerability Analysis Using a Web Server Security Testing Tool (Security Test Repository)
We adapted a widely used web server security-testing tool, Nikto v2.1.4 [15] , to act as the benchmark security test repository. Among other features related to security, Nikto is able to detect more than 6400 potentially dangerous files, detects outdated versions of over 1200 servers and problems specific to 270 servers. The fact that Nikto is open source allowed us to adapt it in two ways: (1) incorporate our own security benchmark features to estimate the vulnerability risk of each test (2) suppress the execution of tests that are covered by the dynamic part (e.g. XSS).
B. Benchmark Dynamic Part Implementation
The dynamic (experimental) part of our implementation focus on attacks against the web server interface and its hosted applications. The main tools supporting the dynamic part of our benchmark methodology are organized as follows:
Target System Monitoring. This tool collects and analyzes the performance, resource consumption, and response correctness measures that allow the assessment of the impact of the attacks to the security of the system under attack (these measures were successfully used to support the evaluation of the impact of software faults on web servers [65] ).
The Workload Simulator is a set of automated tools that exercises the target web serving system components. To this effect, we adapted a java workload implementation of the TPC-W Benchmark [45] to meet the requirements of our security benchmark, taking advantage of elements such as the Remote Browser Emulator (RBE). The main role of the RBE is to emulate users' activities by exercising different features of the web application hosted in the web server component, simulating the activities of a content management website (a wordpress blogging system).
Vulnerability Injector. In our benchmark implementation, the component used to inject vulnerabilities is the Wordpress Content Management Web Application. We used the approach proposed in [34] to inject in this component vulnerabilities related to the improper validation of user input (e.g., Cross-site Scripting), which is one of the most harmful web application vulnerabilities according to OWASP [22] . In the current implementation, the injection of these vulnerabilities is done manually into the application code, although it can be done automatically with proper tools. The set of vulnerabilities injected are representative of XSS vulnerabilities targeting PHP applications, based on the field study presented at [64] .
Attack Executor. The implementation of our attack injector was built into the RBE (Remote Browser Emulator), which currently has the ability to send both valid user requests and malicious user requests to the target. The malicious requests sent to the web server component (the hosted application) attempt to exploit vulnerabilities at its interface and at its hosted application. The attacks executed against the web server interface are aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities related to the improper checking of the HTTP Header attributes, which was very common in the early generation of web servers and remain being reported in vulnerabilities databases. An example of implemented attack to exploit this potential vulnerability is to append a very large set of characters to one of the headers of the HTTP protocol (e.g., Accept, Content-Type, Content-Length) and send it using POST or GET request features from our attack injector. Security Checker. This tool verifies the effect (impact) of the attack on the security attributes of the web server component. It was implemented as an independent component appended to our remote browser emulator tool. After receiving the response of each request (with the respective HTML content), the security checker performs the following tasks:
• Confidentiality Impact. Verifies if the web server is allowed to access restricted areas or contents.
• Integrity Impact. Verifies if the system is providing the expected response (this is done by comparing the HTML content obtained in an inspection phase with the content obtained during the attack execution).
• Availability Impact. Verifies the server availability after an attack execution. This is done by checking the response time of the web server and checking if the web resources are available at the end of the attack.
Risk Calculator. This tool estimates the risk of each successful vulnerability exploitation executed in the dynamic part, considering the impact and exploitability factors presented in section D. The impact factor is estimated considering the outputs provided by the security checker -for each attack, the security checker reports the impact: none, partial, or complete according to the CVSS scoring definitions [55] . The exploitability factor for the vulnerabilities used in our experiments was assigned the highest value (10). The justification for this fact is that all performed attacks can be executed from a remote network (which, according to CVSS, corresponds to the highest level of exploitability), with no authentication into the system, and the attack is easy to mount.
V. BENCHMARKING EXECUTION & RESULTS
This section presents an example of the use of the proposed security benchmark targeting widely used web servers. Upon executing the benchmark, we obtained clear results allowing the ranking of the systems according to the security risk. We detail the global results in subsection D; first we describe the experimental setup, and then the partial results of the static and dynamic parts of the benchmark.
A. Experimental Setup
The experiments were conducted in a client-server Oracle Virtual Box [66] machine environment, using two distinct virtual machines, running two independent operating systems (one to host the web server with its hosted application and another one to host the workload client applications). The system configuration is the same on both virtual machines: Intel Corel Duo 2.40 GHz, 512 MB, 20 Gb IDE Hard Disk, and 100Mbit/s PCnet FAST III Network Adapter. Table I presents the systems that were benchmarked. We choose these four web servers as the benchmark target since they are representative of the market share (namely IIS and Apache) [67] , can be easily acquired (Apache and Lighttpd are in fact free), and were built by different teams (which means that probably we can find different security issues on them). On IIS and Ligtthtpd web servers, CGI plugin was used to enable the execution of PHP pages.
In each benchmark run only one out of four web servers is started at a time. All web servers were configured to disallow directory listing. If the user types a URL and no HTML page is found, instead of listing the content of the folder, a forbidden page is shown. This was done to enable our security checker component to verify confidentiality violations.
B. Static Part Results
Table II presents the results of the benchmark static part and our observations are as follows:
• 212 web server vulnerabilities were collected from the field and analyzed by our vulnerability extractor tool.
• 37% of the vulnerabilities are from IIS51, 30% are from AP13, 22% are from AP22, 11% are from LT14.
• 0.2% of 6456 security tests were successful (successful here meaning that a known vulnerability was found, in this case, by using Nikto). This low number is due to the fact that hundreds of Nikto tests are mounted for servers that were not targeted in our case study.
• Considering the estimated component security risk of the static part, we can rank the evaluated web servers just using the SBench metric: LT14 (20.1), APP22 (24.8), AP13 (59.2), IIS51 (99.7). LT14 is the most secure since it has the lowest SBench measure.
The following analyses are pertinent considering the results of the static part:
• LT14 is the most secure among the evaluated web servers, with lowest security risk measure.
• APP22 results were very close to LT14 on SBench metric. However, if we take into the account the low security risk metric we can observe that LT14 remains the most secure, since it has the lowest score by far.
• Security Risk Results are not related to the number of known vulnerabilities present in the system. For example, APP22 have nearly the double of vulnerabilities of LT14, but SBench metric was very close. This is because both servers have nearly the same amount of vulnerabilities with a high risk. If we compare the results of ISS51 and AP13, which have a similar number of detected known vulnerabilities, the difference is more sounding. Considering only these two servers, AP13 is by far the most secure, since it has fewer vulnerabilities with a high security risk.
C. Dynamic Part Results
The purpose of the dynamic part is to assess the behavior of each targeted web server when attacks are executed against its interface (HTTP protocol) and its content (web application). Two classes of vulnerabilities were manually injected in the hosted Wordpress web application: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) & SQL Injection (SQL). The vulnerabilities exploited in the web server HTTP protocol are those related with Code Injection (CI), Buffer Overflow (BO). Also, in order to test the capacity of our web servers to handle a large number of requests we also executed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Table III presents the main results of the dynamic part, considering benchmark runs (BR) per web server, the total number of attacks, the number of unsuccessful requests (the web server did not return the expected response to the workload client), the impact to the integrity and availability attributes (no confidentiality impact was noticed) and the component risk for low and medium metric category. These results also consider the attacks executed against the vulnerable Wordpress (XSS & SQL) and the web server interface (CI, BO, DoS). For each attack category, 5 benchmark runs were executed with 5 emulated attackers, regardless the DoS attacks where 100 and 300 attacks were executed per benchmark run. Type BR IS51 AP22 AP13 L114 IS51 AP22 AP13 L114 IS51 AP22 AP13 L114 IS51 AP22 AP13 L114 IS51 AP22 AP13 LT14 IS51 AP22 AP13 For each attack, we also present the results considering GET and POST http method. Our observations are as follows:
• 56 out of 264 benchmark runs resulted in impact to the web servers. Considering that each benchmark run exploit a vulnerability (66 runs per web server), we have the following result about attack successfulness: IIS51 was compromised in 58% of the runs; APA22 in 14%; APA13 was compromised in 2% of the runs and LT14 in 12%.
• 26.945 attacks were executed against the vulnerable component (all benchmark runs). IIS51 handled a total of 20746 requests (77%), which means that its response time was significantly higher.
• 4662 requests were sent to the benchmark target.
IIS51 handled 2104 requests. APA22 responded to 997 requests, APA13 to 919, and LT14 to 614.
• 38.5% of the requests to IIS51 were unsuccessful; this rate was the following for the remaining servers: 6.4% for APA22; 0.2% for APA13 and 7.9% for LT14.
• DoS was the most harmful attack. It caused the benchmark target to respond improperly in 30.9% of the time. It was especially harmful to IIS51, since all attacks resulted in unsuccessful requests; followed by APA22 (25%), LT14 (17%), APA13 (3%).
• XSS attacks (XSS-5) and SQL Injection attacks (SQL-5) caused virtually no harm to the benchmark target across the benchmark runs. On IIS51 and LT14 we observed an integrity impact due to the inability of the web server to provide the expected response collected during the baseline runs.
• Command Injection attacks against HTTP protocol caused no harm to the web server when 5 attackers were emulated. Also, it is clear that the results remain the same on both HTTP method attacks.
• Buffer Overflow attacks were harmful just for LT14.
• By considering the estimated component security risk of the dynamic part, we can rank the evaluated web servers as follows: APP13 (1.3 SBench), LT14 (6.6), AP22 (9.9), IIS51 (21.7). APP13 is (by far) the most secure web server since it tolerated more attacks and ISS51 is the most insecure.
The following analyses are pertinent considering the results of the dynamic part:
• The attack tolerance of the benchmarked web servers is not uniform (results are quite different).
• Robustness attacks against the system interface are more dangerous over attacks conducted against the web application. This suggests that the weakness propagation between web application and web servers does not represent a threat to the evaluated servers.
• DoS attacks were the most harmful since they extenuated the capacity of web server resources.
D. Benchmark Result
Table IV presents the consolidated results of each part of our security benchmark runs over the web servers we evaluated. According to the results, the most secure web-server is LT14 web server (26.4 Sbench), which is immediately followed by AP22 (34.7 Sbench) and AP13 (60.4 Sbench) and ISS51 (121.4 Sbench).
Although Apache web servers resisted very well to the attacks executed in the dynamic parts (lowest rate of unsuccessful requests), it did not obtain the highest security score since its results of the static part affected the benchmark metric. IIS web server was the one with higher percentage of known vulnerability and was not able to handle with multiple malicious attacks, being the most unsecure of the evaluated web serving system components.
It is worth noting that our benchmark results allow a clear comparison among the benchmark we evaluated, both in the static and dynamic parts, helping users to select the most secure web server. These results are consistent, since the benchmark measures were not biased by the number of vulnerabilities in the static part and reflected the different behavior of the web servers when facing real attacks. This suggests that our methodology is valid and provides meaningful results and it can help to the definition of widely accepted security benchmark standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a new methodology to benchmark the security of software-based system. This methodology uses security risk as the benchmark metric, which is estimated based on the knowledge of individual risk of vulnerabilities detected in the two benchmark parts. In the static part, the intent is to assess the risk of known vulnerabilities present in the system under benchmark, identified by collecting and analyzing information from public platforms and by running security tests. In the dynamic part, the focus is on the discovery of unknown vulnerabilities by using an experimental approach to stress the target with attacks. In addition to the robustness attacks that are performed, we used vulnerability and attack injection technique to evaluate the impact to the benchmark target of security issues present in other components. To validate our methodology, we presented a case study using widely used web servers. The results of this case study enabled us to compare the security of web servers and showed that the combination of the static and dynamic analysis is a useful way to select the most secure of functionally equivalent systems. We expect that the results presented in this work help users and system integrators to compare and choose among web serving system components. We also expect that this research serves as basis for future project in the field of security benchmarking as it provides a comprehensive methodology to the definition and validation of security benchmarks. Future work will include the extension of the security tests and attackload and new experiments for different class of computer systems. 
